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Abstract
Social learning is learning through the observation of or interaction with other individuals; it is critical in the under-
standing of the collective behaviors of humans in social physics. We study the learning process of agents in a restless
multiarmed bandit (rMAB). The binary payoff of each arm changes randomly and agents maximize their payoffs by
exploiting an arm with payoff 1, searching the arm at random (individual learning), or copying an arm exploited
by other agents (social learning). The system has Pareto and Nash equilibria in the mixed strategy space of social
and individual learning. We study several models in which agents maximize their expected payoffs in the strategy
space, and demonstrate analytically and numerically that the system converges to the equilibria. We also conducted
an experiment and investigated whether human participants adopt the optimal strategy. In this experiment, three
participants play the game. If the reward of each group is proportional to the sum of the payoffs, the median of the
social learning rate almost coincides with that of the Pareto equilibrium.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimum, optimal learning dynamics, multi agent system, multiarmed bandit
1. Introduction
A multiagent system is an active research field and it is applicable to many academic disciplines. In physics, it
has been employed to study the collective behaviors of humans in econophysics[1, 2] and socio-physics[3–5]. If the
system exhibits intriguing macroscopic behaviors, it is challenging to solve the system theoretically. For example, the
voter model abstracts the influence process among humans and exhibits rich mathematical structures, as a consensus
formation[6–9]. In the studies, the model parameters are typically constant and the agents do not learn from their
experiences. If the agents learn from their experience, the problem becomes an reinforcement learning multiagent
system. The model parameters change as the agents learn; therefore, it becomes more difficult to solve the system
than the nonlearning agent system.
Social learning is learning through the observation of or interaction with other individuals[10–14]. As it causes the
tendency to follow others’ behaviors, the system of social learning agents becomes a strongly correlated system. As a
toy model, we have proposed a multiagent system[15] in a restless multiarmed bandit (rMAB). A restless multiarmed
bandit[12] is a slot machine with multiple arms. The term “restless” implies that the payoffs change randomly. We
call an arm with a high payoff a good arm. Each agent maximizes his payoffs by exploiting an arm, searching for a
good arm (individual learning), and copying an arm exploited by other agents (social learning). The system exhibits
a phase transition at a critical value of the social learning probability[15]. If the social learning probability is below
the threshold value, the variance of the number of agents who have found the good arm is proportional to the number
of agents. If it exceeds the threshold value, the variance becomes proportional to the power of the number of agents
with a critical exponent larger than 1. The system shows an oscillatory behavior between the state where almost all
agents know the good arms and the state where none of the agents know them. Further, the optimal value of the
social learning probability is studied. In [16], we studied an rMAB with only one good arm and demonstrated that the
system yields the unique Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal states, thus solving the famous Rogers paradox[17–20].
The question that arises is how the agents adopted the optimal strategies. If the agents can change their social learning
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probability, the optimization problem can be formulated as a reinforcement learning problem. It is a difficult problem
and an efficient approach does not exist. In this study, we investigate the type of strategies that agents adopt when
they attempt to maximize their fitness. Hence, we first analytically and numerically study the best response dynamics
and its natural variants, that is, whether they reach one of the natural equilibria, the Nash equilibrium, and the Pareto
optimal states. Next, we replace the agents with humans and perform an experiment to examine whether humans
tend to employ the optimal strategy[21]. In this experiment, three human players play the rMAB game.
This manuscript is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we state the definition of our model and present
the necessary results from our previous work[16]. In section 4, we study the best response dynamics. We demonstrate
that they converge to the Nash equilibrium or the Pareto optimal state. In section 5, we elaborate the experimental
setup and present the results. The last section presents the concluding remarks.
2. Model
The rMAB contains only one good arm and infinite number of bad arms. There are N agents labeled by n =
1, · · · , N (see fig. 1). The system evolves in time as follows.
In each turn, an agent (e.g., agent n) is chosen randomly. He exploits his arm and obtains payoff 1 if he knows a
good arm. If he does not know a good arm, he searches for it by a random search (individual learning) with probability
1− rn, or copies the information of other agents’ good arms (social learning) with probability rn. The random search
always succeeds with probability qI . Meanwhile, the copy process succeeds with probability qO if and only if at least
one agent knows a good arm.
Subsequently, with probability qC/N , the good arm changes to a bad arm and another good arm appears (envi-
ronmental change). When an environmental change occurs, the agents who know the good arm are forced to forget it
and know a bad one.
This completes the turn. The system will proceed to the next turn.
We call N consecutive turns a step. It is expected that each agent performs one action per step. The probability
that the environment does not change during one step is (1−qC/N)N which is close to e−qC whenN is large. Therefore,
this probability must not be small for the copy process to be meaningful.
Figure 2 shows the schematics of the time evolution of the system.
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
PSfrag replacements
1 2 3 4 N
qC/N
Figure 1: Bandits and agents.
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Figure 2: Time evolution of the state of the system. N0 and N1 are the number of agents who know/do not know a good arm, respectively.
The entity σ is defined in (1).
Mathematical Formulation. Next, we formulate a stochastic model. We introduce the random variable σn defined by
σn =
{
1, if agent n knows a good arm,
0, if agent n does not know a good arm.
(1)
We regard σn as agent n’s knowledge of a good arm. For each turn t, we have a joint probability function P (σ1, · · · , σN |t).
For simplicity we use vector notation: P (~σ|t), ~σ = (σ1, · · · , σN ). Time evolution is described by the Chapman–
Kolmogorov equation:
P (~σ′|t+ 1) =
∑
~σ
T (~σ′|~σ)P (~σ|t), (2)
where T (~σ′|~σ) is the stochastic matrix (transfer matrix) of the system. The matrix is expressed as the product of the
agent action part and the environmental change part:
T (~σ′|~σ) =
∑
~σ′′
TC(~σ′|~σ′′)TA(~σ′′|~σ). (3)
The environmental change part, TC(~σ′|~σ), is obtained as follows. When no environmental change occurs, each agent
stores his knowledge on the good arm. If an environmental change occurs, all the agents lose their knowledge. Thus,
we have
TC(~σ′|~σ) =
(
1− qC
N
) N∏
n=1
δσ′
n
σn +
qC
N
N∏
n=1
δσ′
n
0, (4)
where δσnσm is the Kronecker delta. Next, we examine the agent action part, T
A(~σ′|~σ). The probability that agent n
who does not know the good arm is chosen and finds a good arm is
pn(~σ) =
δσn0
N
{rn(1− δN10)qO + (1− rn)qI}, (5)
N1 =
N∑
n=1
σn. (6)
The matrix TA(~σ′|~σ) is the sum of the probability that no agent changes his knowledge and the probability that one
of the agents changes his knowledge. Thus, we have
TA(~σ′|~σ) = pNC(~σ)
N∏
n=1
δσ′
n
σn +
N∑
n=1
pn(~σ)δσ′
n
,σn+1 ·
∏
ℓ 6=n
δσ′
ℓ
σℓ , (7)
pNC(~σ) = 1−
N∑
n=1
pn(~σ). (8)
This completes the formulation of our stochastic model.
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We make a short comment on the assumption of social learning. In our model, the copy process is assumed to
succeed with probability qO(1−δN10). As already mentioned, this means that social learning succeeds with probability
qO if and only if at least one agent knows the correct answer. However, what we want to emphasize is that the copy
process always fails if no agent knows the answer. Our intention is to rule out copying of incorrect information[12, 19].
For this purpose, it is possible to replace the factor “1− δN10”, for example, with N1/N , the proportion of agents who
know the correct answer. The new model is a natural replacement for the original one. Unfortunately, it can not be
solved analytically. A numerical simulation indicates that the new model seems to behave similarly to the original one
with a smaller qO.
Asymptotic Property of P (~σ|t). It is proven that the matrix T (~σ′|~σ) is irreducible and primitive[22] if and only if
qC > 0, qI > 0, ∀rn < 1. (9)
Under this assumption, the unique Perron vector P (~σ) exists. The Perron vector has the remarkable feature that it is
the long-time limit of an arbitrary solution P (~σ|t) of the Chapman–Kolmogorov equation, that is, lim
t→∞
P (~σ|t) = P (~σ).
We say that the system is in the steady state when the probability function is P (~σ).
The irreducibility of the matrix T (~σ′|~σ) presents a physical meaning. Let ~σ be a knowledge vector at an instant
turn t. Then, for an arbitrary knowledge vector ~σ′, the probability that the change ~σ → ~σ′ occurs after a few turns is
positive (this is merely the definition of irreducibility). Indeed, qC = 0 implies that the knowledge on a good arm will
never be lost and the dynamics of the system may become trivial. In other words, a transition of type ~σ 6= ~0→ ~0 does
not exist. When qI(1 − rn) = 0, the transition ~0 → (0, · · · , 0,
n
1ˇ, 0, · · · , 0) is impossible. Thus, no agent will obtain
a correct information on a good arm when the initial condition is given by ~σ = ~0. Conversely, if (9) is satisfied, an
arbitrary transition ~σ → ~σ′ is possible through ~0. This proves the irreducibility of the probability matrix.
When the matrix T is irreducible, it is also primitive because tr T ≥ T (~0|~0) > 0. Primitivity ensures that the
long-time limit of the probability function lim
t→∞
P (~σ|t) coincides with the Perron vector P (~σ) regardless of the initial
probability function P (~σ|0).
In the following, we assume that the condition (9) holds, in addition to the inequality
qO > 0 (10)
for nontriviality.
3. Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Optimality
Fitness Function. We summarize the necessary results from our previous work[16]. The expected payoff for each agent
in the steady state is defined by
wn = E[σn] =
∑
~σ
P (~σ)σn, n = 1, · · · , N. (11)
We call wn the fitness of agent n. It is shown that a function w(r, r) exists such that wn is expressed as
wn = w(rn, rn), rn =
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=n
rk. (12)
We call w(r, r) the fitness function, which is expressed explicitly by
w(r, r) =
1
a+ qI + (qO − qI)r
{
qI + (qO − qI)r − aqOr
a+ κ
}
, (13)
κ = (N − 1)qI(1− r) + qI(1− r), a = qC
1− qC/N . (14)
Nash Equilibrium. The strategy space of the agents is an N -dimensional unit cube,
J = {~r = (r1, · · · , rN ) | 0 ≤ ri ≤ 1}. (15)
It is noteworthy that the limit ri → 1 is not excluded. In this space, the unique Nash equilibrium point ~rNash exists.
It exhibits the following properties: (i) it is symmetric, ~rNash = (rNash, · · · , rNash), (ii) rNash < 1, (iii) ~rNash is strict,
w(r0, rNash) < w(rNash, rNash),
∀r0 6= rNash, (16)
and (iv) rNash → 0 as {N(qO − qI)− (a+ qO)} → +0. The specific form of rNash is as follows:
rNash =
{
1− η, N(qO − qI) > a+ qO,
0, N(qO − qI) ≤ a+ qO,
(17)
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where
η =
2(a+ qO)
2
(qO − qIN)(a+ qO) + (aN + qO)(qO − qI) +
√
D1
,
D1 = {(qO − qIN)(a+ qO)− (aN + qO)(qO − qI)}2 + 4(N − 1)(qO − qI)(a+ qO)qO(a+NqI).
Because ~rNash is strict, it is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)[23]. Moreover, this is an ESS based on
Thomas[24]. Indeed, the following inequality is true:
w(rNash, r0) > w(r0, r0),
∀r0 6= rNash. (18)
Pareto Optimality. The concept of Pareto optimality is defined in the context of resource allocation. We have regarded
the fitness wn = w(rn, rn) as the utility of agent n. Let us also consider this entity as the amount of resources acquired
by agent n. At this time, the maximum point of the total utility function,
I(~r) =
N∑
n=1
wn(rn, rn), (19)
is suitable as a Pareto optimal point. It is shown in the Appendix that only one maximum point exists, which we call
~rPareto. It is strictly maximal and symmetric: ~rPareto = (rPareto, · · · , rPareto).
It is clear that rPareto is the only maximum point of w(r, r). Our result is that
rPareto =


(a+ qIN)X − (a+ qI)Y
qINX + (qO − qI)Y , N(qO − qI) > a+ qO,
0, N(qO − qI) ≤ a+ qO,
(20)
where
X =
√
(N − 1)(a+ qO)(qO − qI),
Y =
√
NqO(a+NqI).
It is not difficult to verify that (i) rPareto < 1, and (ii) rPareto → 0 as {N(qO − qI)− (a+ qO)} → +0.
Comparison of Fitness. We consider three types of fitness per agent: the fitness of individual learners, that in the
Nash equilibrium state, and that in the Pareto optimal state. They are defined as follows, respectively:
wI = w(0, r), wNash = w(rNash, rNash), wPareto = w(rPareto, rPareto). (21)
It is proven that the inequality, wI ≤ wNash ≤ wPareto, is true. The equality holds if and only if N(qO − qI) ≤ a+ qO.
4. Optimal Strategies of Agents
Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality are concepts in equilibrium. Thus, it is important to demonstrate that
some learning processes converge to the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal states. A standard model is the best
response dynamics, which is expected to reach the Nash equilibrium state. In this section, we study the best response
dynamics and its variants. Best response dynamics seems to have been appeared by simplifying fictitious play[25–27].
One of the purpose of both learning models is to explain Nash equilibria by each agent’s local search method of
strategy[28].
4.1. Best Response Dynamics
Several versions of the best response dynamical system exist. Herein, we consider the continuous-time best response
dynamical system.
First, we introduce the best response function,
βN (r) = argmax
0≤r≤1
w(r, r). (22)
The best response function of agent n is expressed as βN (rn). See eqs. (12) and (13). The properties of the function
βN (r) are summarized in fig. 3.
The continuous-time best response dynamics is a learning process defined by the following dynamical system:
drn
dt
(t) = βN (rn(t)) − rn(t), n = 1, · · · , N. (23)
5
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Figure 3: Plot of the best response function βN (r). The entities r
∗ and r∗ are expressed as r∗ = 1 − a+qI(N−1)(qO−qI ) and r∗ = 1 −
qI (a+qO)−(qO−qI )a+
√
D2
2(N−1)qI (qO−qI) , where D2 = {qI(a+ qO)− (qO − qI)a}
2 + 4qI(qO − qI)(a + qO)
2.
Because the range of the function βN (r) is included in the closed interval [0, 1], this is a well-defined system of ordinary
differential equations on the strategy space J . It is known that not all dynamical systems of this type converge to
a Nash equilibrium point[29]. Nonetheless, we shall demonstrate that any solution to equation (23) converges to the
unique Nash equilibrium point ~rNash.
The following relation derived from fig. 3 is noteworthy:
βN (r)− βN (rNash) = −(N − 1)γ(r)(r − rNash), 0 ≤ γ(r) ≤ 1
2
. (24)
We write γ(rn(t)) as γn(t) for brevity. Let xn(t) = rn(t)− rNash. Because rNash is the fixed point of βN (r), the next
equation is derived,
βN (rn(t))− rn(t) = −γn(t)
∑
k 6=n
xk(t)− xn(t). (25)
We introduce the positive definite quadratic form:
V (~x) =
1
2
N∑
n=1
x2n +
1
2
(
N∑
n=1
xn
)2
. (26)
The function V (~x) contains a unique minimum at ~x = ~0. We differentiate V (~x) along a solution of (23),
d
dt
V (~x(t)) =
N∑
n=1
dxn
dt
(t)
{
xn(t) +
n∑
k=1
xk(t)
}
= −
N∑
n=1
(1 − γn(t))xn(t)2 −
{
1 +
N∑
n=1
γn(t)
}(
n∑
k=1
xk(t)
)2
≤ −1
2
N∑
n=1
xn(t)
2 − 1
2
(
N∑
n=1
xn(t)
)2
= −V (~x(t)).
This yields
0 ≤ V (~x(t)) ≤ V (~x(0))e−t → 0 (t→∞).
Thus, it is proven that an arbitrary solution ~r(t) of (23) converges to ~rNash.
It is noteworthy that the discrete best response dynamics,
rn(t+ 1) = rn(t) + α{βN (rn(t)) − rn(t)}, n = 1, · · · , N, (27)
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also converges to the Nash equilibrium irrespective of the initial condition ~r(0) ∈ J if the learning rate α is sufficiently
small1. This is evident because (23) is a continuous limit α → +0 with substitution rn(t + 1) ← rn(t + α) in the
left-hand side of (27).
Further, in eq. (27), the strategies of all agents are updated simultaneously. Meanwhile, a model exists in which
only the randomly selected agent’s strategy is updated. The latter is represented by replacing the learning rate α with
α/N in eq. (27).
4.2. Derivative Best Response Dynamics
The best response dynamics is a natural and straightforward learning procedure that can lead the system to the
Nash equilibrium. However, when no agent can obtain other agents’ strategies, it is impossible for agent n to know
the value, βN (rn(t)), of the best response function.
Therefore, as a “realistic” model, we introduce the following system:
drn
dt
(t) =
∂w
∂r
(rn(t), [rn(t)]), n = 1, · · · , N, (28)
where [r] ≡ max(r∗,min(r∗, r)) is the truncation of r to the closed interval [r∗, r∗] (see fig. 4). Because w(rn, rn) is
the expected income of agent n, he could estimate the differential coefficient,
∂w
∂r
(rn(t), [rn(t)]).
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Figure 4: Plot of the function [r]. The entities r∗ and r∗ are defined in fig. 3.
In reinforcement learning, it is natural to replace the estimate by a numerical derivative. Agent n estimates
w(rn, rn) by the time average of his income σn for rn, rn. He changes rn to rn +∆rn and estimates the time average.
We divide the difference in the time averages by ∆rn and obtain the derivative.
The fitness function w(r, r) contains a unique maximal point as a function of the first variable r. This point is a
strictly decreasing function of the second variable r. Let βN (r) be the function thereof. Subsequently, the following
relation is true:
βN (r) = βN ([r]) = max(0,min(1, βN (r))).
As a consequence, the crucial condition
0 ≤ ∂w
∂r
(0, [rn(t)]), and
∂w
∂r
(1, [rn(t)]) ≤ 0, n = 1, · · · , N,
holds. This ensures that any solution ~r(t) of the system (28) remains in the domain J . Therefore, the introduction of
the function [r] renders (28) well-defined.
We wish to demonstrate that ~r(t) converges to the Nash equilibrium point. When N(qO−qI) ≤ a+qO, β(rn(t)) = 0
such that the right-hand side of (28) is negative whenever rn(t) > 0. Therefore, rn(t) → 0 as t → ∞. In the
N(qO − qI) > a+ qO case, we first describe the analytical property of the Nash equilibrium point. It is asymptotically
1A sufficient condition is that α ≤ 2
4+N{N+2+(N+3)2} .
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Figure 5: Numerical integration of the derivative best response dynamical system for various initial points. Parameters: qC = 0.1, qI = 0.2,
qO = 0.8, N = 2. Our analytical result is that rNash = 0.1537....
Figure 6: Histogram of {W (~r1), · · · ,W (~r1000)}. The number of classes is 30. Parameters: qC = 0.2, qI = 0.3, qO = 0.8, N = 10.
stable. Indeed, substituting rn = rNash + δrn into (28) yields
d
dt
δ~r = Aδ~r, A =


µ ν · · · ν
ν µ
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . ν
ν · · · ν µ

 ,
where
µ =
∂2w
∂r2
(rNash, rNash) < ν =
∂2w
∂r∂r
(rNash, rNash) < 0.
The coefficient matrix A contains two eigenvalues, µ+(N − 1)ν with algebraic multiplicity 1 and µ− ν with algebraic
multiplicity N − 1. This proves the asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium point.
Next, we numerically demonstrate that an arbitrary solution, ~r(t), of the equation (28) converges to the Nash
equilibrium point. First, we integrate the equation (28) for the N = 2 case. Figure 5 shows the integral curves of
(28) for various initial points. The equation is symmetrical with respect to the exchange of variables r1 and r2. This
implies that every solution approaches the Nash equilibrium point as t→∞.
8
Next, we differentiate the function V (~x), defined in (26), along a solution of the equation (28),
d
dt
V (~x(t)) =W (~r(t)), W (~r) =
N∑
n=1
∂w
∂r
(rn, [rn])
{
xn +
N∑
k=1
xk
}
.
We randomly choose 1000 points, ~rk ∈ J , k = 1, · · · , 1000 and calculate W (~rk). Figure 6 shows the histogram of data
{W (~rk)}k=1,··· ,1000. This suggests that W (~r) is negative on J .
The results above strongly indicate that ~r(t) converges to the Nash equilibrium point.
4.3. Cooperative Dynamics
When agents are cooperative, the system may converge to the Pareto optimal state. A possible dynamical system
that approaches the Pareto optimal point can be expressed as follows:
drn
dt
=
∂I
∂rn
(~r), n = 1, · · · , N,
where I(~r) is the total fitness function defined in (19). When the initial point is close to the Pareto optimal point
~rPareto, this system will converge to it because ~rPareto is the asymptotically stable unique fixed point of the system.
Indeed, the Hessian of I at ~rPareto is positive definite. See Appendix.
However, this intuitive Pareto dynamics presents some deficiencies. First, the solution is not guaranteed to remain
in J . Next, it is difficult to know whether the Pareto optimal point is a global attraction point2.
Therefore, we will introduce another dynamical system with better properties, that is, a Pareto version of the
best response dynamics. A natural definition of the best response function of the Pareto type for agent n may be
argmax
0≤rn≤1
I(~r). This is the larger zero rn of the function,
∂I
∂rn
(~r) =
∂w
∂r
(rn, rn) +
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=n
∂w
∂r
(rk, rk),
truncated to the closed interval [0, 1]. Unfortunately, the resulting function is not desirable because of its complexity.
Instead, we adopt the following simple definition of the best response function βP (r) of the Pareto type,
βP (r) = max(0,min(1, βP (r))), where (29)
βP (r) = larger zero r of
∂w
∂r
(r, r) +
∂w
∂r
(r, r).
This is an extension of βN (r), the best response function of the Nash type. The features of the function βP (r) are
summarized in fig. 7. Additionally, it exhibits the following properties: (i) the inequality βP (r) ≤ βN (r) is true, and
(ii) rPareto defined in (20) is the unique fixed point.
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Figure 7: Plots of the function βP (r). The entity r∗∗ is given by r∗∗ = 1−
qI (a+qO)−a(qO−qI )+
√
D3
2(N−1)qI (qO−qI ) , where D3 = {qI(a + qO) − a(qO −
qI)}
2 + 4qI(qO − qI)(a + qO)(a +NqO). The entity r
∗ is defined in fig. 3.
Now, we introduce the cooperative dynamical system, that is, the best response dynamical system of the Pareto
type:
drn
dt
= βP (rn)− rn, n = 1, · · · , N. (30)
2Saddle points exist outside the domain J .
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This is well defined because 0 ≤ βP ≤ 1 such that ~r(t) ∈ J is guaranteed. The inequality βP (r) ≤ βN (r) suggests that
agents obeying (30) can be described as more cooperative than in the case of (23).
We shall demonstrate that all the solutions of (30) converge to the Pareto optimal point ~rPareto. Hence, we present
the following estimation derived from fig. 7:
βP (r) − βP (rPareto) = −(N − 1)γP (r)(r − rPareto), (31)
0 ≤ γP (r) ≤ max

 1
N + 1
,
1√
NqO
qI
+ 1

 ≡ c < 1.
This is an analogy of (24). Let xn = rn−rPareto and let γn(t) = γP (rn(t)). Subsequently, we have a relation analogous
to (25):
βP (rn(t))− rn(t) = −γn(t)
∑
k 6=n
xk(t)− xn(t). (32)
Further, the time derivative of the function V (~x) defined in (26) along the solution of (30) reads
d
dt
V (~x(t)) ≤ −2(1− c)V (~x(t)), ∴ 0 ≤ V (~x(t)) ≤ V (~x(0))e−2(1−c)t → 0 (t→∞).
Therefore, we conclude that all solutions of (30) converge to the Pareto optimal point ~rPareto.
It is noteworthy that a discrete version of the system (30),
rn(t+ 1) = rn(t) + α{βP (rn(t))− rn(t)}, n = 1, · · · , N, (33)
converges to the Pareto optimal point as well if the learning rate α is sufficiently small.
Equation (33) is a model equation of the simultaneous-update type (see also eq. (27)). An individual update-type
model is realized by replacing the learning rate α with α/N in eq. (33).
5. Experimental Studies
We have performed an experiment to study whether human adopts the Pareto equilibrium. It is a laboratory
experiment performed in Kitasato and Hirosaki University. In the experiment, multiple human players participate
in the game and compete for the number of coins to be acquired. A total of thirty three subjects (1 female and 32
males; mean age(1 s.d.) =20.2(1.6)) participated and we label them as i ∈ {1, · · · , 33}. There are 11 groups of three
subjects (N = 3) and we label them as G ∈ {1, · · · , 11}. The subjects in each group know each other and the total
reward given to the participants is in proportion to the total number of coins acquired by them (3 yen/coin). It is an
incentive to cooperate with each other in the same group to maximize the number of coins. The optimal strategy of
the players is rPareto. The reward is in the range of 2000 yen and 3000 yen per subject.
There are three rounds of thirty minutes and we label them as R ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Between the rounds, there are two
intervals of 10 minutes and the players can discuss how to maximize the number of coins. The optimal strategy is
rPareto. We adopt the parameter setting qI = 0.1, qO = 0.8, qC = 0.2 so that rPareto = 0.23 and rNash = 0.34. Table 1
summarizes the settings of the experiment.
N S T R Reward Date Subject Pool
3 33 263 1 3 yen/coin 2017/6 and 2017/11 Both Univ.
3 33 319 2 3 yen/coin 2017/6 and 2017/11 Both Univ.
3 33 322 3 3 yen/coin 2017/6 and 2017/11 Both Univ.
Table 1: Experimental design. N : the number of subjects in each group, S: the total number of subjects, T : average number of turns
(actions) of the subjects, R: the round number.
5.1. Method
We have developed a browse rMAB game. The game interface is shown in Figure 8. The experiments were
performed in the laboratory. Experimenter explained the experimental procedures and the rewards, the subjects were
asked to sit on chairs that are located far from each others. While playing the game, it was forbidden to talk to other
subjects so that it was impossible to share the information whether they know the bandit with σ = 1 or not. During
the intervals, the subjects could freely talk with others and discussed how to get more coins.
Figure 8 shows the screenshot of the game. When the player does not know the bandit with σ = 1, he sees the
left figure. There are two options, individual learning and social learning, which are chosen by pushing the buttons
with labels, ”search !” and ”cheat !”, respectively. When the player knows the bandit with σ = 1, he sees the right
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Figure 8: Screenshot of the game. Left figure shows the screen when the player does not know the bandit with σ = 1. Individual learning
and social learning are chosen by pushing the button, ”Search ! ” and ”Cheat !”, respectively. If he knows the bandit with σ = 1, he sees
the screen in the right figure. Usually, he exploits the bandit by pushing the button ”Get Coin !”.
figure. Usually, the player exploits the bandit by pushing the button with label ”Get Coin !” and get some coins. The
number of coins is in the range {1, 2, 3} and it is fixed at random with probability 1/3 when one finds the bandit. This
mechanism was introduced to make the game interesting. The other two buttons provide the player to changes the
bandit. If the number of coins in the exploit is one, one should want to changes the bandit. If one push ”Search” or
”Cheat !”, one searches the bandit with σ = 1 again. If he succeeds, he can change the number of the coins. ”Cheat”
button is better than ”Search” button when qO > qI . The subjects were taught about the function before the start of
the experiment. Hereafter, we explain the results of the experiment. Summary of the statistics are given in Table 2.
5.2. Results
The left figure of Figure 9 shows the scatter plot of (ri, σi). There are three rounds in the experiment, R ∈ {1, 2, 3},
we show the plots with different symbols for the rounds. The black triangle shows (rPareto, wPareto). The right figure
shows the boxplots of ri. The broken and dotted lines shows rNash and rPareto. The collective average of ri in round
2 and round 3 are 0.31 and 0.30 and they are slightly larger than rPareto = 0.23. The median (50 percentile) of ri in
round 2 and round 3 are 0.23 and 0.25, which almost coincide with rPareto. As the experiment proceeds, we observe
more collaborative behavior.
R ropt Mean of ri(SE) SD of ri Median of ri w(ropt, ropt) Mean of σi(SE)
1 0.23 0.35(2) 0.07 0.33 0.36 0.40(1)
2 0.23 0.31(5) 0.08 0.23 0.36 0.42(1)
3 0.23 0.30(4) 0.06 0.25 0.36 0.37(1)
Table 2: Summary of experimental results. ropt is the optimal strategy.
In order to test the above hypothesis, we adopt a hierarchical Bayesian method. We assume ri for subject i who
participate in the experiment of group G[i] ∈ {1, · · · , 11} in round R[i] ∈ {1, 2, 3} obeys,
ri ∼ t(ν = 3, µ = r(R[i], G[i]), scale = σA)
r[R,G] = rA +∆rR[R] + ∆rG[G]
∆rR[R] ∼ N(0, σ2R)
∆rG[G] ∼ N(0, σ2G)
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Figure 9: Left: Scatter plot of (ri, σi). There are three rounds in the experiment, R ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Empty circles, empty diamonds and gray
circles show the plot for R = 1, 2, 3, respectively. The black triangle shows (rPareto, wPareto). Right: Boxplot of ri. The broken (dotted)
horizontal line shows rNash (rPareto).
∆rR and ∆rG describe the dependence of r(R,G) on R and G, respectively. As for σA, σR, σG, we assume the
Half-Cauchy prior,
σA, σR, σG ∼ Cauchy+(25).
We studied the posterior distribution of rA,∆rR[R],∆rG[G] and estimate the 95% Bayesian credible intervals using
Stan 2.19.2 in R 3.6.2 software. We have checked the convergence of the sampling by the Gelman-Rubin statistics.
Table 3 shows the results for rA +∆rR[R].
R = 1 R = 2 R = 3
mean 0.34 0.24 0.26
95% C.I. [0.28,0.41] [0.17,0.30] [0.20,0.31]
Table 3: The mean and 95% Bayesian credible intervals of rA +∆rR[R].
We see that the credible intervals of rA + ∆rR[R] for R = 2, 3 does not include rNash = 0.34. We also reject
the hypothesis that ∆rR[R = 1] = ∆rR[R = 2] ,∆rR[R = 1] = ∆rR[R = 3] with significance of 1% by estimating
P (∆R[1] < ∆R[2]) and P (∆R[1] < ∆R[3]). We observe collaborative behaviors in R = 2 and R = 3.
6. Concluding Remarks
We herein introduced a multiagent system in a restless multiarmed bandit game and studied the optimal learning
dynamics of agents theoretically and experimentally.
As is well known, the Nash equilibrium is a typical solution in noncooperative games. We demonstrated that
best response dynamics drove the system to equilibrium. In the case of cooperative game, we introduced a new
dynamical system, that is, a best response dynamical system of the Pareto type and proved that it converged to the
Pareto optimal point. We also conducted a cooperative game type experiment. As shown in fig.9, the distribution of
strategies of the participants appeared to be centered around the Pareto optimal point as the round proceeded. This
observation was supported by a hierarchical Bayesian analysis.
The following issues can be explored in the future. First, we have introduced a new concept of the best response
function in section 4, that is, the best response function of the Pareto type. It is a natural extension of the function
of Nash type. It may be possible to define the same type of function in generic systems, and we believe that it is a
useful concept. Second, it would be interesting to perform noncooperative game type experiments to examine whether
humans adopt the Nash strategy. Third, we investigated the agents’ behavior based on the optimal strategies in
equilibrium. This procedure is reasonable because, as shown in section 4, the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal
states are the natural destinations in the long run. The experiments on Nash equilibrium may be explained better if
a time-dependent theory is considered.
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Appendix Maximum Point of the Total Fitness Function
Derivative of the total fitness function, I(~r), is given by
1
a
∂I
∂rn
(~r) =
1
a+ κ
{
κ(qO − qI)− qI(a+ qO)
(a+ qn)2
−K
}
, (.1)
K =
N∑
k=1
qIqOrk
(a+ qk)(a+ κ)
, qn ≡ qI + (qO − qI)rn.
Because J is compact, at least one maximum point of I(~r) in J exists.
Maximum Point in J◦. Let ~r be one of the maximum points of I(~r). First, we assume that ~r is an inner point of J :
~r ∈ J◦. This is a zero of (.1). Therefore, we have
(qO − qI)κ− qI(a+ qO) > 0,
a+ qn =
√
(qO − qI)κ− qI(a+ qO)
K
.
Thus, this point is on the diagonal: r1 = · · · = rN = r > 0. Therefore, this point is also a maximum point of w(r, r).
This is merely the unique maximal point, rPareto, of w(r, r). Therefore, ~r is the unique maximum point of I(~r) in J
◦.
It is straightforward to verify that
(qO − qI)κ− qI(a+ qO) > 0 ⇐⇒ N(qO − qI)− (a+ qO) > 0.
Maximum Point on Jb. Next, we assume that the maximum point, ~r, is a boundary point of J : ~r ∈ Jb.
First, we demonstrate that ∀rn equals 0 or 1. Let
∃rj ∈ (0, 1). Subsequently
1
a
∂I
∂rj
=
1
a+ κ
{
(qO − qI)κ− qI(a+ qO)
(a+ qj)2
−K
}
= 0.
Because ~r is a boundary point, rn equals 0 or 1. However, when rn = 0, we have
1
a
∂I
∂rn
=
1
a+ κ
{
(qO − qI)κ− qI(a+ qO)
(a+ qn)2
−K
}
> 0.
When rn = 1, we have
1
a
∂I
∂rn
=
1
a+ κ
{
(qO − qI)κ− qI(a+ qO)
(a+ qn)2
−K
}
< 0.
This contradicts the maximality of ~r.
Next, we demonstrate that ∀rn equals 0. Let r1 = · · · = rk = 0, rk+1 = · · · = rN = 1. Subsequently, κ = kqI and
1
a
∂I
∂rn
=
1
a+ kqI
{
(qO − qI)lqI − qI(a+ qO)
(a+ qn)2
−K
}
, K =
(N − k)qIqO
(a+ qO)(a+ kqI)
.
Because ~r is a maximal point of I(~r), we have
1
a
∂I
∂r1
=
1
a+ kqI
{
(qO − qI)kqI − qI(a+ qO)
(a+ qI)2
−K
}
≤ 0, (.2)
1
a
∂I
∂rN
=
1
a+ kqI
{
(qO − qI)kqI − qI(a+ qO)
(a+ qO)2
−K
}
≥ 0. (.3)
In the case of k = 0, (.3) reads
qI
−(a+ qO)
(a+ qO)2a
− NqIqO
(a+ qO)a2
≥ 0.
This cannot occur. Next, we consider the 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 case. From (.2) and (.3), we have
qI
(qO − qI)k − (a+ qO)
(a+ qI)2(a+ kqI)
≤ (N − k)qIqO
(a+ qO)(a+ kqI)2
≤ qI (qO − qI)k − (a+ qO)
(a+ qO)2(a+ kqI)
.
This is also impossible because 0 < qI < qO. Finally, we investigate the k = N case. The inequality (.2) reduces to
(qO − qI)N − (a+ qO) ≤ 0.
This is the only possible case. That is, if the maximum point of I(~r) is on the boundary Jb, it is merely the origin
~r = ~0. In this case, the origin is indeed the maximum point of I(~r): because
(qO − qI)κ− qI(a+ qO) = qI{(qO − qI)N − (a+ qO)} ≤ 0,
(.1) is negative on J except for the origin.
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Strict Maximality. We explicitly demonstrate that rPareto is strictly maximal when rPareto ∈ J◦. We consider the
Hessian of the total fitness function at the Pareto optimal point,
H(~rPareto) =
1
2
(
∂2I
∂rm∂rn
(~rPareto)
)
= −


α+ β β · · · β
β α+ β
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . β
β · · · β α+ β

 ,
where
α = a
(qO − qI){(qO − qI)κPareto − qI(a+ qO)}
(a+ qPareto)3(a+ κPareto)
β =
aqIqO(a+ qII)
(a+ qPareto)2(a+ κPareto)2
+
Naq2IqOrPareto
(a+ qPareto)(a+ κPareto)3
,
and
κPareto = NqI(1− rPareto), qPareto = qI + (qO − qI)rPareto.
The Hessian contains two eigenvalues, −α with algebraic multiplicity (N−1), and−(α+Nβ) with algebraic multiplicity
1. Because
(qO − qI)N − (a+ qO) > 0 ⇐⇒ (qO − qI)κPareto − qI(a+ qO) > 0,
we obtain α, β > 0. This proves the strict maximality.
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